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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
-vsJEROME YECK,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This cause arose from a denial of motions to withdraw
guilty pleas made by Appellant Jerome Yeck, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, §77-24-3 (1953), which were entered
in response to criminal proceedings brought by the State
of Utah, charging him in the Second Judicial District with
theft by deception, a third degree felony, in violation
of §76-6-405, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; and in the Third
Judicial District with one count of forgery, a second
degree felony, in violation of §76-6-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; and two counts of theft by deception, a
second degree felony, in violation of §76-6-405, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOPER COURT
On or about September 1, 1976, the defendant-appellant
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entered a plea of guilty to the crime of theft by deception,
a third degree felony,

in the District Court of the Second

Judicial District in and for Weber Countv, State of Utah.
On or about September 2, 1976, defendant entered a plea of
guilty to one count of a three-count Information in the
Third Judicial District to the charge of theft by deception, a second degree felony.

Defendant's sentencing was

scheduled for September 15, 1976, in the Second Judicial
District, and Seotember 16, 1976, in the Third Judicial
District.

Upon defendant's

~fotion,

prior to those dates,

the sentencing dates were vacated and on September 22nd
and September 23rd, resoectively, in the Second and Third
Judicial Districts, Defendant moved to withdraw his plea.
On September 23, 1976, Judge Stewart M. Hansen, Jr., ruled
that Appellant's plea could not be withdrawn in the Third
Judicial District case, and defendant was sentenced to a
term in the state prison of one to fifteen years, sentence
to be stayed pending this Appeal, and also pending a
90-day diagnostic evaluation at the Utah State Prison.
On October 13, 1976, Judge Calvin Gould ruled that the
Appellant's plea could not be withdrawn in the Second
Judicial District case, and Appellant's sentence was stayed
pending this Appeal.
RELIEF SOUGET ON APPEAL
Anpellant seeks an order of this Court reversing
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...

the judgments rendered by the lower courts, and a ruling
remanding this cause to the trial courts for trials on all
of the counts, both those involved in the plea and those
dismissed, against the defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Apnellant Jerome W. Yeck is a resident of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and during the years of 1974 through

1976, was engaged in various businesses in the northern
Utah area, principally in Salt Lake County.

Most of Appel-

lant's business dealings were in the area of property
development and other varieties of land transactions.

All

of the charges involved in the instant case arose from
transactions involving sale or acquisitions of real property between Appellant, financial institutions, and other
third parties.

Appellant was initially charged in the

Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, with one count of forgery in violation
of §76-6-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, a felony of the
second degree, and two counts of theft by deception, in
violation of §76-6-405, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, a
second degree felony.

Contemporaneously with these

charges, Appellant was charged in the Second Judicial
District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah,
with one count of theft by deception, in violation of

§76-6-Lf05

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, a third degree

3
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felonv.

Furthermore, defendant was informed at the time

of his arraignment and at subsequent proceedings in the
Third Judicial District, that the Utah State Attorney General's office had also received complaints to their "1,:rhite
Collar Crime Section", and that they were prepared to file
additional felony charges for alleged similar conduct
against the defendant.

Appellant had the assistance of

counsel throughout all proceedings in the courts below.
At preliminary hearings in the Salt Lake City Court and
the Ogden City Court, and at arraignment proceedings in
the Second and Third Judicial District Courts, and at the
proceedings snecifically giving rise to this Apneal,
Appellant was represented by Attorney Phil L. Hansen, a
member of the Utah State Bar in good standing, from Salt
Lake City, Utah.

At the arraignments in both Districts,

defendant initially entered pleas of not guilty to all
charges.

Trials were scheduled in late September.

Prior

to the trial dates and on or about the 1st and 2nd day
of September, 1976, Appellant, upon advice of his counsel,
entered into plea negotiations with the County Attorney's
office in both Weber and Salt Lake County.

The prose-

cutors involved were Robert L. Wallace for Weber County,
and Robert Stott for Salt Lake County, and Joseph
McCarthy, representing the White Collar Crime Division
of the Utah State Attorney General's office.

The

!+
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arrangement concluded from the negotiations was that the
Appellant would enter a plea of guilty to the theft by
deception charge in Weber County, and would plead guilty
to one theft by deception count in Salt Lake County.

In

return for these pleas, Salt Lake County would dismiss
the other two counts of the Information alleging forgery
and theft by deception.

The Weber County Attorney would

agree that the Appellant should be sentenced to a maximum
of only five years in the state prison, rather than 1-15
years, as the case had actually arisen prior to the
criminal code revisions of 1973, and the Utah State Attorney General's office agreed not to proceed with any
charges or complaints filed in their office.

Appellant

then entered guilty pleas in Weber and Salt Lake County,
and was referred for oresentence investigative reports in
both counties by the Utah State Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and was scheduled for sentencing on
September 15th and 16th, 1976, respectively, in Ueber
and Salt Lake Counties.

At the time of the entering of

the pleas, both Judge Stewart M. Hansen, Jr., in Salt
Lake County, and Judge Calvin Gould in Weber County,
examined the Appellant extensively, pursuant to the
required inquiries of Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
Appellant responded appropriately to the questions posed
by the judges, that he was entering his plea voluntarily,
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without any duress or coercion, that he understood the consequences of his plea, that he was doing so on the advice
of counsel, and that he understood that the judges had
made and would make no advance nromises as to the eventual
sentence to be imposed.
by both judges.

The pleas of guilty were accepted

Subsequent to apnellant's entering pleas

of guilty, but prior to sentencing, Appellant contacted
Attorney John T. Caine, a member in good standing of the
Utah State Bar,

p~1cticing

in Ogden, Utah.

Appellant

explained to the attorney that he did not believe, in
fact,

that he was guilty of the offenses charged, that

he had not intended to defraud or to do any acts which
injured anyone.

In reviewing the cases with the Appel-

lant, Caine informed the Appellant that it was his opinion
that he did have realistic and viable defenses to the
charges, and that in fact, it appeared that his conduct
was not criminal, but should more appropriately be
adjudicated in a civil lawsuit,

(see, Record on Appeal,

Affidavit of Jerome Yeck and John T. Caine, filed with
the Appellant's Motion to Withdraw a Plea).
Following this discussion, Appellant released Attorney Phil L. Hansen and retained John T. Caine to represent him in further Proceedings.

Appellant immediately

filed motions for withdrawal of his plea in both the
Second and Third Judicial Districts.

6
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filing said Motions, Appellant had not been advised by either
of the Adult Parole & Probation agencies in Weber or Salt
Lake County, as to any recommendations made by them to
the courts as to the sentence, nor was he advised by the
court or any other office of the court, as to what his
sentence would be (see, Record on Appeal, Affidavit of
Jerome Yeck).

On September 15 and 16, respectively, Appel-

lant appeared with Attorney John T. Caine in Second and
Third Judicial District Courts.

At this time, the courts

took note of the application for withdrawal of the plea,
continued sentencing, and set Appellant's motion for argument on September 22nd and September 23rd, respectively.
On September 22nd and September 23rd, a hearing was held
before Judge Calvin Gould and Judge Stewart M. Hansen, Jr.,
respectively, on Appellant's applications for withdrawal
of plea.

Said application was made pursuant to

§77-24-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

Affidavits had

theretofore been presented to the court by Appellant and
his attorney, and oral arguments were conducted in each
hearing.

Following oral arguments, Judge Gould took the

case under advisement, and ruled on October 5, 1976, in
a Memorandu~ Decision, that Appellant's plea had been
entered voluntarily, that defendant could not have been
unaware of the import of the court's questioning at the
time the plea was entered, and therefore the motion was

7
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•

denied.

Judge Stewart M. Hansen, Jr., ruled on Appellant's

motion immediately following the hearing.

Judge Hansen's

ruling was similar to Judge Gould's, with the additional
finding that the state would not be prejudiced by allowing
Appellant to withdraw his plea and go to trial on all
charges, but that he believed in the exercise of his sound
discretion, that withdrawal of the plea was not warranted
in this case.

It should be carefully noted that through-

out the record and transcript in this Appeal, Appellant
consistentlv stated that if the pleas were withdrawn, he
would expect to be tried on all counts, and that all plea
negotiations would be vitiated by such withdrawals.

Sub-

sequent to the above rulings, Appellant filed this
Appeal, and pursuant to an agreement reached with Judge
Stewart H. Hansen, Jr., underwent a 90-day diagnostic
evaluation conducted in the community by the Utah State
Prison staff.

Judge Calvin Gould further agreed to stay

any imposition of his sentence pending the outcome of
the Appeal, and pending the 90-day evaluation.

On Jan-

uary 14, 1977, Appellant appeared before Judge James
Sawaya for sentencing, following the filing of the 90-day
evaluation report.

Judge Sawaya, acting upon the reports'

recommendation, sentenced the defendant to serve a term
in the Utah State Prison of not less than one, nor more
than fifteen years.

That sentence was later stayed,

8
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pending resolution of the Appeal before this court, and
defendant was continued at liberty on an appeal bond.

No

action has yet been taken as to sentencing by Judge Calvin
Gould in the Second Judicial District.
ARGUMENT
THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, AND AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF DUE
PROCESS, AND WHEN REQUESTED BY THE ACCUSED AT ANY TIME
PRIOR TO SENTENCING, CANNOT BE DENIED UNLESS THE STATE
DEMONSTRATES THAT IT WILL BE IRREPARABLY DAMAGED OR THAT
THERE IS A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST WHICH MUST BE SERVED.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states, in part: "That in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed."

This right

to trial by jury is classified as are other important and
basic concepts enunciated by the Constitution, as
fundamental.

This important classification makes it

incumbent upon those attempting to deny such a right to
demonstrate compelling reasons for their action.

Trial

by jury is an essential ingredient of due process, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
(See, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, (1967), reaffirmed
in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1975), when the Su1neme
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Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to an
accused of the right to trial is fundamental, and is imposed
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on
the states.)

Such a fundamental right should not and

cannot be a subject of judicial discretion as to its
imposition or its abrogation.

This court has heretofore

announced in the cases of State v. Lee Lim, 7 P.2d 825 (1932),
and the more recent case of State v. Plum, 378 P.2d 671(1963),
that in effect, the withdrawal of a plea of guilty by
an accused is discretionary with the court.

Both of these

dealt inter alia with whether or not the trial judge
within his sound discretion, exercised that discretion
properly in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the plea.
This court, in upholding the free exercise of judicial
discretion in this area, did not focus on the more critical issue of the denial of the right to trial by jury
through the exercise of that discretion.

It is interesting

to note that in the instant case, both judges

and prose-

cutors took the position that the burden of proof to
demonstrate why the plea should be withdrawn, was on the
defendant-appellant, and that through some nebulous standard,
the court would then determine whether that hurden of
proof was met and whether the courts' discretion should
be exercised in the defendant's favor.

This court should

take careful note that, in effect, this is a complete

10
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reversal of any judicial treatment of a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution.

In cases dealing with the

preservation of fundamental rights as essential to due
process,the burden has been and is on the state to show
that there is a compelling interest which abrogates or
overrides the necessity to preserve the fundamental right.
The only way, therefore, that this juxtaposition can be
corrected in the instant case, is for this court to reverse
their orevious decisions, and take the bold, but clearly,
required step to place the burden of proof in denying the
right to trial in the context of plea withdrawal squarely
upon the state's shoylders.

In the instant case, the

Appellant requested, prior to sentencing, a trial by jury.
He, in effect, through the Fourteenth Amendment, requested
that the state insure due crocess and provide access to
him of this most fundamental right.

The state presented

no comoelling reason or compelling interest that would
justify or require denial of Appellant's fundamental
right to trial by jury.

Furthermore, Judge Hansen ruled

that the state would in no way be harmed should the
Aopellant be granted a new trial, but that in the exercise of his discretion, he did not feel that a new trial
was warranted.
Some may argue that judicial discretion in this area
is of legislative creation, and therefore more properly
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a subject for legislative correction.

It would be a severe

mistake for this court to relv on that tenuous oosition.
The only statute involved in this case is §77-24-3, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.

This is a Procedural provision rather

than a substantive provision of the law.

This provision

of the Code allows a defendant to make application for
withdrawal of a plea and a request for trial prior to judgment.

The substantive application of the law in terms of

allowing judicial discretion in this area has been courtcreated in this state.

This court, therefore, can correct

what is obviously an unconstitutional practice in which
the denial of the fundamental right is discretionary,
where the burden of oroof is on that person asking to have
his fundamental right enforced.

There is no decision of

this court or of any higher court which places the burden
on the defendant to assume the burden of proof in asserting his fundamental right.

The State of Utah, through

the conduit of the Fourteenth Amendment, is required to
guarantee due process of law in state criminal proceedings.
The preservation of due process is an inherent duly of
the trial court, and this court ought not to allow the
abrogation of that duty and the erosion of due process
apparent in this case to stand without careful consideration of the critical issues presented in this appeal.
It would be very easy for this court to consider only

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lower court discretion and speak in terms of abuse of that
discretion in resolving this Particular case, as Appellant
readily concedes that there is no evidence to support an
abuse of judicial discretion.

However, the issue at the

heart of this appeal is much more critical than to be given
cursory review, or cursory judgment.

This court has a

responsibility, as the supreme judicial body of this state,
to act as a guardian of individual rights, and it is
incumbent upon this court to guarantee that those rights
are not abrogated by a compulsion for protection of procedure in the criminal process.

Appellant does not ask

that this court reverse his conviction, nor does he ask
that this court relieve him from the burden of being
prosecuted by various state agencies.

What Appellant

does ask is that the state be required to present evidence to a finder of fact, and prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, that defendant is guilty.

The only method avail-

able to Appellant and to anyone desiring a forum for the
presentation of all facts, is a trial.

Some will argue

that if this court takes a bold step in the preservation
of individual rights in this particular instance, that
everyone who enters into a plea negotiation and then later
desires to withdraw his plea, will be allowed to do so
and thus, plea negotiations will no longer be a viable
alternative for prosecutors and defense attorneys, and
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the court will never know whether his discussions with an
individual, upon the taking of a plea, are meaningless or
will later be challenged in a proceedings of this nature.
This court should carefully consider, in responding to
this argument, that the fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution at issue herein is the right to a trial
by jury, not the right to plea bargain, with its attendant advantages for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
the judiciary.

Plea bargaining, as it is utilized in the

processing of a criminal case in resnect to the avoidance
of trial by .iury, is merely a procedural tool with which
an accused may avail himself, if he so chooses.

It does

not take the place of a trial by jury in terms of constitutional protection, nor in our society, should it ever
be considered as a surrogate for a decision by one's peers.
Therefore, neither the state, the prosecutor nor the
judiciary, should ever take the position that the inconvenience created by not being able to substitute an
available procedure should take precedence over the
protection of the fundamental right of trial by jury.
Furthermore, judicial guidelines can and should be
established to insure that the withdrawal of the plea
and request for a trial is being done in good faith,
without intent to delay or hinder prosecution, is timely
made, and will not cause irreparable injury to the state.
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These guidelines could act as parameters for limited exercise
of judicial discretion to insure the integrity of the
system, without the relatively unfettered and indiscriminate
abrogation of the right to trial by jury that currently
exists under present conditions, where there are no guidelines an<l the burden is solely on the accused to justify
his plea withdrawal, and his only recourse to demonstrate
abuse of judicial discretion.
In the instant case, the defendant, through affidavit
and in oral argument, demonstrated his good faith in
requesting a trial by jury.

This request was made at an

appropriate time prior to the knowledge of a potential
sentence and prior to the imposition of that sentence.
There was no demonstrable irreparable harm or damage to
the state, nor any compelling reason presented which would
justify removal of the basic protection of the fundamental
right of trial by jury afforded to

Appellant by the

Fourteenth Amendment, as an integral part of due process.
Therefore, the trial courts, in both cases, were in error
in not preserving trial by jury for the Appellant and this
Court must now, to avoid any further vagueness or ambiguity
in this critical area, demonstrate by judicial fiat that
the right to trial by jury is paramount and is an essential element of due process which must be preserved
through all stages of the criminal process until sentence
is imposed.

15
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CONCLUSION
The application for withdrawal of plea, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is procedural in nature.

The

concept of judicial discretion which has heretofore been
adhered to by this court in reviewing the withdrawal of a
plea in a criminal case, has been court-created and is
not imposed by any statute.

The right to trial by jury

is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution, and is a basic element of due process
guaranteed to all individuals by the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.

This court has never before reviewed

the preservation of this fundamental right in the context
of plea withdrawal in a criminal case.

The preservation

of trial by jury must be guaranteed by the trial court in
all cases and where, in the context of a plea withdrawal,
a jury trial is requested, the burden must shift to the
state to show a compelling state interest or a compelling
reason why the accused should not be allowed trial by
jury.

The trial court should have discretion to determine

whether or not the application is in good faith and timely,
and whether irreparable damage will be done to the state.
In the instant case, the aoolication was made in good
faith,

timely, and there was no showing by the state of

any compelling reason or compelling state interest for the
vitiation of the fundamental riRht of trial by jury, nor

16
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was an irreparable damage to the state

de~onstrated.

Wherefore, Appellant respectfully requests that this
court reverse the decisions of the Second and Third Judicial District Courts, and allow defendant-appellant to have
a trial by jury on all counts heretofore filed against him
by the Second and Third Judicial Districts, and pending
against him by the Utah State Attorney General's office.
submitted,

17
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STATE OF UTAH
SS.

COUNTY OF WEBER

)

Comes now Donna Czekala, bein8 first duly sworn
upon her oath, and deposes and says that she mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to the
following persons:
Mr. Earl Darius
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
5alt Lake City, Utah 84114
on this 4th dav of March, 1977.

DONNA CZEKALA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of

March, 1977.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:
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